Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions between the players, and quantitatively characterizes the conflicting incentives and strategic responses. In this chapter, we provide an overview of deception games in three different environments and extend the baseline signaling game models to include evidence through side-channel knowledge acquisition to capture the information asymmetry, dynamics, and strategic behaviors of deception. We analyze the deception in binary information space based on signaling game framework with a detector that gives off probabilistic evidence of the deception when the sender acts deceptively. We then focus on a class of continuous one-dimensional information space and take into account the cost of deception in the signaling game. We finally explore the multi-stage incomplete-information Bayesian game model for defensive deception for advanced persistent threats (APTs). We use the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) as the solution concept for the deception games and analyze the strategic equilibrium behaviors for both the deceivers and the deceivees.
Introduction
Deception is a technique used to cause animals [9] , human [13, 35] or computer systems [3] to have false beliefs. The purpose of deception is to mislead the deceivees to behave against their interests but favorably to the deceiver. It is a fundamental type of interactions that can be found in applications ranging from biology [9] to criminology [35] and from economics [13] to the Internet of Things (IoT) [31] . Cyberspace creates particular opportunities for deception, since information lacks permanence, imputing responsibility is difficult [20] , and some agents lack repeated interactions [24] . For instance, online interactions are vulnerable to identify theft [14] and spear phishing [1] , and authentication in the IoT suffers from a lack of infrastructure and local computational resources [2] . Deception can be used as an approach for attacks. For example, phishing is a typical deceptionbased attack that is one of the top threat vectors for cyberattacks [32] . Phishing can be email-based in which a phisher manipulates the email to appear as a legitimate request for sensitive information [4, 5] . It can also be website-based in which the deceiver uses genuine looking content to camouflage a legitimate website to attract target deceivees to reveal their personal data such as credit card information and social security number. Defenders can also implement deception. Defenders in the security and privacy domains have proposed, e.g., honeynets [7] , moving target defense [39] , obfuscation [30] , and mix networks [36] . Using these techniques, defenders can obscure valuable data such as personally identifiable information or the configuration of a network. Using these approaches, defenders can send false information to attackers to waste their resources or distract them from critical assets. They can also obscure valuable data such as sensitive information or the configuration of a network to avoid direct accesses from the attackers. Both malicious and defensive deception have innumerable implications for cybersecurity. Successful deception fundamentally depends on the information asymmetry between the deceiver and the deceivee. Deceivees make indirect observations of the true state and then make decisions. Deceivers can take advantage of this by pretending to be a trustworthy information provider. It is possible to fool, mislead, or confuse the deceivees. But the deceivers need to plan their strategies and take actions that may be costly. Therefore, successful deception also requires the deceivers to have the ability to acquire information, accurately understand the goals of the deceivees, and make the induced actions predictable.
The deceivers strategically manipulate the private information to suit their own self-interests. The manipulated information is then revealed to the deceivees, who, on the other hand, make decisions based on the information received. It is important for the deceivee to form correct beliefs based on past observations, take into account the potential damage caused by deception, and strategically use the observed information for decision-making. If deception is necessary to achieve the deceivers' goal that would cause damages to the deceivees, the deceivees can then be prepared to invest resources in detecting and denying the deceptions as well as recovering the damage.
Modeling deceptive interactions online and in the IoT would allow government policymakers, technological entrepreneurs, and vendors of cyber-insurance to predict changes in these interactions for the purpose of legislation, development of new technology, or risk mitigation. Game-theoretic models are natural frameworks to capture the adversarial and defensive interactions between players [11, 16, 22, 23, 37, 42, 50, 51, 52, 53] . It can provide a quantitative measure of the quality of protection with the concept of Nash equilibrium where both defender and an attacker seek optimal strategies, and no one has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from their equilibrium strategies despite their conflict for security objectives. The equilibrium concept also provides a quantitative prediction of the security outcomes of the scenario the game model captures. With the quantitative measures of security, game theory makes security manageable beyond the strong qualitative assurances of cryptographic protections. Recently, we have seen game-theoretic methods applied to deal with problems in cross-layer cyber-physical security [23, 31, 40, 52, 54, 55] , cyber deception [16, 27, 28, 29, 37, 53] , moving target defense [39, 56, 57] , critical infrastructure protection [19, 50, 51, 58, 59, 60, 61] , adversarial machine learning [30, 62, 63, 64, 65] , insider threats [66, 67] , and cyber risk management [68, 69, 70, 71] .
This chapter shows a class of modeling of deception based on signaling games to provide a generic, quantitative, and systematic understanding of deceptions in the cyber-domain. We show three variants of the model to illustrate the applications in different situations. We consider the cases when the deceivee is allowed to acquire knowledge through investigations or by deploying detectors. The baseline signaling game model is extended to include evidence through side-channel knowledge acquisition. We also show a multi-stage Bayesian game with two-sided incomplete information and present a dynamic belief update and an iterative decision process that are used to develop longterm optimal defensive policies to deter the deceivers and mitigate the loss.
Related Work
Deception game is related to a class of security games of incomplete information. For example, Powell in [34] has considered a game between an attacker and a defender, where the defender has private information about the vulnerability of their targets under protection. Powell models the information asymmetric interactions between players by a signaling game, and finds a pooling equilibrium where the defender chooses to pool, i.e., allocate resources in the same way for all targets of different vulnerabilities, and the attacker cannot know the true level of vulnerability of all targets. Brown et al. [6] have studied a zero-sum game between an attacker and a defender in the scenario of ballistic missile positioning. They have introduced the incomplete information to investigate the value of secrecy by restricting the players' access to information.
Previous literature has also considered deception in a variety of scenarios including proactive defense against advanced persistent threats [11, 16, 17, 19, 37] , moving target defense [8, 39, 41] , and social engineering [28, 29, 42] . Horák et al. [16] have considered a class of cyber deception techniques in the field of network security and studied the impact of the deception on attacker's beliefs using the quantitative framework of the game theory by taking into account the sequential nature of the attack and investigating how attacker's belief evolves and influences the actions of the players. Zhang et al., [37] have proposed an equilibrium approach to analyze the GPS spoofing in a model of signaling game with continuous type space. They have found a PBNE with pooling in low types and separating in high types, and provided an equilibrium analysis of spoofing. The hypothesis testing game framework in [43] has studied the influence of deceptive information on the decision making and analyzed the worst-case scenario by constructing equilibrium strategies. The model proposed by Ettinger et al. [10] has used an equilibrium approach to belief deception in bargaining problems when the agents only have coarse information about their opponent's strategy.
Organization of the Chapter
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we briefly describe common game-theoretic approaches for security models and introduce the basic signaling game model and define the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE). In Section 2.3 we formulate the deception using a signaling game model with a detector over a binary information space, and describe the equilibrium result. In Section 2.4, we present a signaling-game-based framework of a deception game to model the strategic behaviors over a continuous one-dimensional information space. We also consider the knowledge acquisition for the receiver through investigations. In Section 2.5, we show a multi-stage Bayesian game framework to model the deception in advanced persistent threats. Section 2.6 discusses the results and provides concluding remarks.
Game Theory in Security
Game theory is the systems science that studies interactions between rational and strategic players (or agents) that are coupled in their decision makings. Players are rational in the sense that they choose actions to optimize their own objectives (e.g., utility or cost), which capture varying interaction contexts. Being strategic in game theory refers to that players choose their own actions by anticipating the actions of the other agents. Their decision makings are coupled because their objective functions depend both on their own actions, and on the actions of the other players. Among the game-theoretic cybersecurity models, Stackelberg game, Nash game, and signaling game account for the most commonly used approaches [28] .
Stackelberg games consist of a leader (L) and a follower (F). L has actions " Î " and receives utility " , and F has actions & Î & and receives utility & . Once both players have taken actions, L receives utility " ( " , & ) and & ( " , & ). In Stackelberg games, F acts after knowing L's action. Therefore, defensive cybersecurity models often take the defender as the leader and the attacker as the follower by considering the worst-case scenario that the attacker will observe and react to defensive strategies. Let ( ) denote the power set of the set . In other words, Nash equilibrium requires each player to simultaneously choose a strategy that is optimal given the other player's optimal strategy. In a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, each player chooses one specific strategy (i.e., one pure strategy), while in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, at least on player randomizes over some or all pure strategies.
A signaling game is a two-player dynamic game of incomplete information. Signaling game typically names two players as sender (S, she) and receiver (R, he) [12] . Signaling game is information asymmetric because the sender privately possesses some information that is unknown to the receiver. The private information is usually referred to as state (or type) of the world. The sender communicates the receiver by sending a message, and the receiver only learns about the state through the message. Generally, the degree of conflict of interest between S and R may range from perfectly aligned (e.g., Lewis signaling game [21] ) to completely opposite (e.g., zero-sum game [33] ). The timing of the game is described as follows:
1. Nature randomly draws a state with a prior common to both players, and the sender privately observes the state. 2. The sender sends a message to the receiver. 3. The receiver takes an action upon observing the message.
One key feature of cyber deception is the multi-stage execution of the attack. A deceiver has to engage the deceivee in multiple rounds of interactions to gain the trust. The dynamic interactions have been observed in APT threats and the operation of honey devices [19] . Hence signaling games provide a suitable description of essential features of the deception, and the basic signaling game models will be elaborated in the following section.
Signaling Game Model
Let ∈ denote the state privately possessed by that is unknown to . The state space can be discrete (e.g., ? ≡ { B , C }) or continuous (e.g., E ≡ [ , ]). For example, the state could represent, whether the sender is a malicious or benign actor, whether she has one set of preferences over another, samples of data stream, and location coordinate. For simplicity but without loss of generality, we focus on discrete state space in this introductory description of the signaling game. The state is drawn according to a prior distribution common to both players. Harsanyi conceptualized the state selection as a randomized move by a non-strategic player called nature. Let denote the probability mass function of the state, where I∈J K ( ) = 1. All aspects of the game except the value of the true state are common knowledge. gives the likelihood with which R believes that the true state is θ given the message . Based on the belief µ U , then chooses an action a ∈ A according to a strategy σ U ∈ Γ U . Similarly, may employ pure strategy σ U ( ) or mixed strategy σ U ( | ), where σ U ( ) yields the action acts upon the message m, and σ U ( | ) produces the probability with which takes action given message m. The action a is the final decision of that represents the inference about the true state. Let O : Θ×M×A → ℝ denote a utility function for such that O θ, , yields the utility of the player when her type is θ, she sends message , and plays action . Similarly, let b : Θ×M×A denote R's utility function so that b θ, , gives his payoff under the same scenario.
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
In two player games, Nash equilibrium defines a strategy profile in which each player best responds to the optimal strategies of the other player. Signaling games motivate the extension of Nash equilibrium in two ways. First, information asymmetry requires to maximize his expected utility over the possible types of . 
In Definition 2.1, C and h are the perfection conditions for and , respectively, that characterizes the sequential rationality of both players. Specifically, C captures that optimally determines O * by taking into account the effect of O on b . h says that responds rationally to 's strategy given his posterior belief about the state . j states that the posterior belief is updated based on Bayes' rule. If the observation is a probability-0 event, then Bayes' rule is not applicable. In this case, any posterior beliefs over the state space is admissible. j also implies that the consistency between the posterior beliefs and strategies: belief is updated depending on the strategy that is optimal given the belief. There are three categories of strategies: separating, pooling, and partially-pooling equilibria, which are defined based on the strategy of . In separating PBNE (S-PBNE), chooses different strategies for different states. In this case, is able to identify each state with certainty. In pooling PBNE (P-PBNE), chooses the same strategy for different states. This strategy makes the corresponding message uninformative to . In partially-pooling PBNE (PP-PBNE), however, chooses messages with different, but not completely distinguishable, strategies for different states. This makes the belief of remain uncertain.
Binary State Space: Leaky Deception using Signaling Game with Evidence
In [27] , Pawlick et al. have modeled the strategic interactions between the deceiver and the deceivee over a binary information space by extending signaling games by including a detector that gives off probabilistic warnings called evidence when acts deceptively. Signaling games with evidence add the red detector block to the S and R blocks. The probability λ e θ, ) of emitting evidence e depends on S's type θ and the message m that she transmits [27] .
Game-Theoretic Model
With reference to Fig. 2 .1, the detector emits evidences based on whether the message m is equal to the state θ. The detector emits ∈ ≡ {0,1} by the probability λ e | θ, . Let e = 1 denote an alarm and e = 0 no alarm. The evidence e is assumed to be emitted with an exogeneous probability that neither nor can control. In this respect, the detector can be seen as a second move by nature. Let β ∈ [0,1] be the true-positive rate of the detector. For simplicity, both truepositive rates are set to be equal: β = λ(1 | 0,1) = λ(1 | 1,0). Similarly, let α ∈ [0,1] denote the false-positive rate of the detector with α = λ(1 | 0,0) = λ(1 | 1,1). A valid detector has β ≥ α. This is without loss of generality, because otherwise α and β can be relabeled. The timing of the game becomes:
1. Nature randomly draws state θ ∈ {0,1} according to p(θ).
2.
privately observes θ and then chooses a message m based on strategy σ y ( |θ).
3. The detector emits evidence e ∈ {0,1} with λ(e|θ, ).
4. After receiving both and , forms a belief system b ( | , ) and then chooses an action ∈ {0,1} according to strategy b ( | , ).
The following assumptions characterizes a cheap-talk signaling game with evidence. The message is payoff-irrelevant in a cheap-talk signaling game. 
Equilibrium Concept
The involvement of the evidence extends the PBNE in Definition 2.2 as follows. 
Equilibrium Results
Under Assumption 2.1-1 to 2.1-5, the cheap talk signaling game with evidence admits no separating PBNE. This results from the opposing utility functions of S and R. S wants to deceive R, and R wants to correctly guess the type. It is not incentive-compatible for S to fully reveal the type by choosing a separating strategy. For brevity, define the following notations:
Δ B U gives the benefit to R for correctly guessing the type when θ = 0, and Δ C U gives the benefit to R for correctly guessing the type when θ = 1. Lemmas 2.1-2.2 solve for σ U * within five regimes of the prior probability p(θ) of each type θ ∈ {0,1}. The regimes in Fig. 2 .2 shift towards the right as Δ B U increases. Intuitively, a higher p(1) is necessary to balance out the benefit to R for correctly identifying a type θ = 0 as Δ B U increases.
The regimes shift towards the left as Δ C U increases for the opposite reason.
Lemma 2.2 gives the optimal strategies of R in response to pooling behavior within each of the five parameter regimes. In pooling PBNE, the message "on the equilibrium path" is the one that is sent by both types of . Messages "off the equilibrium path" are never sent in equilibrium, although determining the actions that would play if were to transmit a message off the path is necessary in order to determine the existence of equilibria. The pooling PBNE of the cheap-talk signaling game with evidence are summarized by Fig. 2.3 and σ U * (1 | 1,0) = 1 − σ U * (1 | 1,1) . One of the types of S prefers to deviate to the message off the equilibrium path. Intuitively, for a conservative detector, S with type θ = prefers to deviate to message 1 − m, because his deception is unlikely to be detected. On the other hand, for an aggressive detector, S with type θ = 1 − prefers to deviate to message 1 − , because his honesty is likely to produce a false-positive alarm, which will lead R to guess = .
For ≠ 1 − , since the Middle regime does not support pooling PBNE, we search for partiallyseparating PBNE. In these PBNE, and play mixed strategies. In mixed-strategy equilibria in general, each player chooses a mixed strategy that makes the other players indifferent between the actions that they play with positive probability. Theorems 2.1-2.2 give the results. 
Continuous State Space: Knowledge Acquisition and Fundamental Limits of Deception
In [38] , Zhang et al. proposes a game-theoretic framework of a deception game to model the strategic behaviors of the deceiver S and the deceivee R and construct strategies for both attacks and defenses over a continuous one-dimensional state space. R is allowed to acquire probabilistic evidence about the deception through investigations, and misrepresenting the state is costly for S. The deceivability of the deception game is analyzed by characterizing the PBNE.
Game-Theoretic Model
We assume that the state θ is continuously distributed over Θ ≡ [ , θ] according to a differentiable probability distribution F(θ), with strictly positive density f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Again, all aspects of the game except the value of the true state θ are common knowledge.
Message and Report.
In this game model, we use the message to describe the format of information about the state S communicates to R. We introduce a notion report to represent the value of state carried by the message. After privately observing the state θ, S first determines a report r ∈ Θ for the true state θ, and then sends R a message ∈ M, where M is a Borel space of messages. Let Ω: M → Θ denote the report interpretation function such that Ω( ) gives the report r carried in . Given the true state θ, we say m tells the truth if Ω( ) = θ. We assume that for each state θ ∈ Θ, there is a sufficiently large number of messages that yields the same report, and each ∈ M has a unique value of report Ω( ). In other words, the message space can be partitioned as M =∪˜M˜, with |M˜| → ∞ for all r and M˜∩ M˜o = ∅ if r ≠ r′, and ∀ ∈ M˜, Ω( ) = r. This assumption can capture the feature of rich language in practical deceptions. We further assume that message is formed by "common language" that can be understood precisely by both S and R. In other words, function Ω is commonly known by both players.
Strategies and actions. Let σ y : Θ → Θ be the strategy of S such that r = σ y (θ) determines the report r of the true state θ. Let η y : Θ×Θ → M be the message strategy of S associated with σ y such that = η y (r) selects the message from M˜ when the strategy σ y (θ) determines the report r and the true state is θ. Given θ, the strategy σ y (θ) determines the set of messages M ž Ÿ ( ) for η y to choose from, and η y determines which specific message ∈ M ž Ÿ ( ) to send. We assume σ y (θ) associated with η y induces a conditional probability q y ( |θ). After receiving m, R chooses an action a ∈ A ≡ Θ according to a strategy σ U : Θ×M → A using r = Ω( ) . σ U (r, ) gives the action R acts upon the message m (and thus r = Ω( )). The action a is the final decision of R that represents the inference about the true state.
Utilities. The utility functions of S is given by U y ( , θ, r) ≡ U £ (a, θ) − kU ¥ (r, θ) where
h is the utility depending on the induced action a in R, U ¥ ≡ −(r − θ) h is the utility related to the misrepresentation of the true state, and k ≥ 0 quantifies the intensity of U ¥ . On the deceivee's side, his utility is given by U U ≡ −( − θ) h , which takes into account the risk induced by R's misinference of the true state θ via his action . Define, for all θ ∈ Θ, α y (θ) ≡ argmin 4 C y ( , θ, r), and α U (θ) ≡ argmin 4 C U ( , θ); i.e., α U (θ) and α y (θ) are two actions taken by R as functions of θ that are the most preferred by R and S, respectively.
Beliefs. Based on m (and thus r = Ω( )) and his prior belief f(θ), R forms a posterior belief µ U : Θ → [0,1] of the true state θ ∈ Θ. The posterior belief µ U (θ| ) gives the likelihood with which R believes that the true state is θ based on m. R then determines which action to choose based on his belief µ U .
Deceivability
We restrict attention to a class of monotone inflated deception, in which the strategy profile (σ y , σ U ) satisfies conditions in the following definition. Suppose that the investigation emits evidence by the probability ( | , ) . Let = ( = 0| B , ) and = ( = 1| C , ) be the two true positive rates, which are private information of .
With a slight abuse of notation, let b ( , , ): × × → be the strategy of with evidence . Fig. 2.4 depicts the signaling game model for the deception with knowledge acquisition through investigation. 
Equilibrium Concept
The knowledge acquisition of the signaling game over continuous state space extends the PBNE in Definition 1 to the following. ( ) .
acquires evidence through investigation, and updates belief using evidence as,
may be set to any probability distribution over .
In separating equilibrium, the deceiver sends message with different values of report ( ) for different states. Separating equilibria are also called revealing equilibria because the strategic deceivee can infer the true state even if ( ) does not tell the truth. In pooling equilibrium, the deceiver sends message ∈ ® with the same value of report ( ) = for all states. In partialpooling equilibrium, however, the deceiver sends the message with the same report for some states and different reports for other states. Clearly, the PBNE strategy O * associated with a DR (resp. UR) is pooling (resp. separating) strategy.
Equilibrium Results
From the definition of UR, the equilibrium strategy of gives the most preferred action, Proposition 2.1 notes that in S-PBNE, the optimal strategy O * of has to choose a report that is strictly larger than the true state , but eventually O * runs out of such report for > . 
In any SLAPH equilibrium, both players have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategies. This requires the boundary state Ê to be consistent in the sense that the equilibrium at Ê is well-defined. Specifically, the utility of has to satisfy the following boundary consistency (BC) condition at Ê :
where k ∈ I and Ç ∈ f g * (I Ë ) . The BC condition implies that is indifferent between sending k ∈ I with * = b * ( O * ( Ê ), k ) and sending Ç ∈ f g * (I Ë ) with action * = Ê .
The conflict of interest, b, is a utility-relevant parameter for S that can induce incentives for S to reveal partial information about any state θ ∈ [θ Ì , θ] to R while her utility-maximizing P-PBNE strategy σ y * is maintained. This can be achieved based on the assumption |M | → ∞ and the fact that there exists an SLAPH equilibrium. Continuous Type: Due to the cyber deception, the system defender cannot directly determine whether a user is legitimate or not even he can observe the user's apparent behaviors. Thus, user has a type which is a random variable and the realization ∈ : = [0,1] is private information of . The value of the type indicates the strength of the user in terms of damages that she can inflict on the system. A user with a larger type value indicates a higher threat level. At each stage ∈ {0,1, ⋯ , }, chooses an action ê ∈ ê and chooses an action ê ∈ ê . The user's actions represent the apparent behaviors and observable activities from log files such as a privilege escalation request and sensor access. A defender cannot identify the user's type from observing his actions. The defender's action includes prevention and proactive behaviors such as restricting the escalation request or monitoring the sensor access. The action pair ( ê , ê ) is known to both players after stage and forms a history ℎ ê : = { B , ⋯ , ê•C , B , ⋯ , ê•C }. The state ê ∈ ê shows the system status at each stage such as the location of the APTs. Since the initial state B and history ℎ ê uniquely determine the state, ê contains information of history up to and has the transition kernel described by êÑC = ê ( ê , ê , ê ). 
Equilibrium Concept
The insider threats of APTs lead to the following definition of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) where the defender chooses the most rewarding policy to confront the attacker's bestresponse policies. A conjugate-prior method allows online computation of the belief and reduces Bayesian update into an iterative parameter update. The forwardly updated parameters are assimilated into the backward dynamic programming computation to characterize a computationally tractable and time-consistent equilibrium solution based on the expanded state space.
Case Study
We consider a four-stage transition with the first three stages related to cyber transition of the APTs and the last stage related to the benchmark Tennessee Eastman (TE) process as the targeted physical plant. The TE process involves two irreversible reactions to produce two liquid (liq) products. The process shuts down when the safety constraints are violated such as a high reactor pressure, a high/low separator/stripper liquid level. The attacker can revise the sensor reading, trigger an undesired feedback-control, and cause a loss. The state ê has five possible values representing the working status of the system where the state 1 is most desirable and state 5 is the least desirable. We can obtain the normal operation reward and the reward of attacks from the simulation. The belief state { ê , ê } uniquely determines the belief distribution which is assumed to take the form of the beta distribution. The larger ê means that the user is more likely to have a smaller type value and have lower threats to the system.
As shown in Fig. 2.6 , a high value êo:á b * ( êo ) for the defender is the result of a healthy system state ê as well as a belief of a low-threat user. At the most desirable system state ê = 1, attackers will not attack because the reward incurred is insufficient. Then the defender does not need to defend and obtains the maximum utility. To investigate the effect of the defender's belief, we change the belief state ( ê , ê ) from (9,1) to (1,9), which means that the defender grows optimistically that the user is of a low threat level with a high probability. Since players' value functions are of different scales in terms of the attack threshold and the probability, we normalize the value functions with respect to their maximum values to illustrate their trends and make them comparable to the threshold and the probability as shown in Fig. 2.7 . When ê is large, the defender chooses to protect the system with a high probability, which completely deters attackers with any type values because the probability to attack is 0.
As the defender trusts more about the user's legitimacy, the defending probability decreases to 0 when ê = 1. Since the defender is less likely to defend, the attacker bears a smaller threshold to launch the attack. The resulted defending policy captures a tradeoff between security and economy and guarantees a high value for defenders at most of the belief states. The central insight from the multi-stage analysis is the adversary's tradeoff between the instantaneous reward and the hiding to arrive at a more favorable state in the future stages. The higher the belief of the defender in as a legitimate user, the less probability he will act defensively and thus the attacker has a smaller threshold to launch the attack.
Conclusion
Deception is a technique that can be viewed as an advanced approach to secure the devices or attacks. Understanding deception quantitatively is pivotal to provide rigor, predictability, and design principles. In this chapter, we have formulated signaling-game theoretic models of deceptions over discrete and continuous information spaces. We have studied leaky deception models and extended the baseline perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) to versions involving knowledge acquisitions characterized by evidences. We have analyzed the impacts of evidence on the belief updates and strategy constructions on the equilibrium path.
In the binary state space, the leaky deception game with evidence admits an equilibrium that includes a regime in which the deceivee should choose whether to trust the deceiver based on the evidence, and regimes in which the deceivee should ignore the message and evidence and merely guess the private information based only on the prior probabilities. For the deceiver, the equilibrium results imply that it is optimal to partially reveal the private information in the former regime.
We have also studied leaky deception games over a continuous one-dimensional information space. We have studied the PBNE as the solution concept to analyze the outcome of the deception game and characterize the deceivability of the game. The proposed deception game admits a class of PBNE called SLAPH (Separating in Low states And Pooling in High states). The necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such PBNE are given. However, a full undeceivable region does not exist and there exists a deceivable region. We have also shown that the deceivable region can be partitioned into multiple sub-deceivable regions without decreasing total utilities for the deceiver when the conflict of interest is insignificant.
Furthermore, we have explored a multi-stage incomplete information Bayesian game model for defensive deception frameworks for critical infrastructure networks with the presence of advanced persistent threats (APT). With the multi-stage and multi-phase structure of APTs, the belief of the defender is formed dynamically using observable footprints. The conjugate priors are used to reduce Bayesian updates into parameter updates, which leads to a computationally tractable extended-state dynamic programming that admits an equilibrium solution consistent with the forward belief update and backward induction. Tennessee Eastman process has been used as a case study to demonstrate the multi-stage deception game. The numerical simulations have shown that the game-theoretic defense strategies have significantly improved the security of the critical infrastructures.
